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1. Introduction 
Game theory is a field of applied mathematics for analyzing complex interactions among 
entities. It is basically a collection of analytic tools that enables distributed decision process. 
Game theory (GT) provides insights into any economic, political, or social situation that 
involves individuals with different preferences. GT is used in economics, political science and 
biology to model competition and cooperation among entities, and the role of 
threats/punishments in long term relations. Contemporary social science is based on game 
theory, economics, and psychology in which mathematical logic is applied. The formation of 
coalitions or alliances is omnipresent in many applications. For example, in political games, 
parties, or individuals can form coalitions for improving their voting power. Recently, 
computer science and engineering have been added to the list of scientific areas applying GT. 
While in optimization theory the goal is to optimize a single objective over one decision 
variable, game theory studies multi-agent decision problems. In social sciences and 
economics, the focus of game is the design of right incentives/payoffs; in engineering it 
comes to efficiency – how to design efficient decentralized schemes that take into account 
incentives. However, there are still similarities when applying game theory to different 
disciplines. For example, a measurement allocation framework for localization in wireless 
networks, based on the idea to allocate more measurements to the nodes which contribute 
more, mimics a capitalist society where the gains are mostly reinvested where more profit is 
expected. It also replicates the concept of natural selection in population genetics. 
In general, a game consists of a set of players (decision makers), while each player has its 
strategy, whereby utility (payoff) for each player measures its level of satisfaction. Each 
player’s objective is to maximize the expected value of its own payoff (Myerson, 1997). 
(Srivastava V., et all, 2005) proposed a mapping of network components to game 
components according to the following table:  
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Network component Game component 
Nodes Players 
Available adaptations Action set 
Performance metrics Utility function 
Table 1. Classification of coalitional games 
Game theory can be applied to communication networks from several aspects: at the 
physical layer, link layer and network layer. However, there a certain challenges when 
applying game theory principles to wireless networks. For example, GT assumes that the 
players act rationally, which does not exactly reflect real systems. Furthermore, realistic 
scenarios necessitate complex models, yet the main challenge is to select the appropriate 
utility function, due to a lack of analytical models that would map each node’s available 
actions to higher layer metrics.  
1.1. Notation 
A normal form representation of a game is given by G = <N, Si, {ui}>, where N = {1,…,n} is the 
set of n of players. We indicate an individual player as i ∈ N and each player i has an 
associated set Si ={si1,…,sim} of possible strategies from which, in a pure strategy normal form 
game, it chooses a single strategy si ∈ Si to be realized.  s = {s1,…,sN} is the strategy profile of 
N players, i.e., the outcome of the game, while s-i is the strategy profile of all players but the 
i-th, and {ui} = {u1,…,uN} is the utility function of the i-th player. The utility function 
measures the preferences of each player to a given strategy, assuming the strategies of other 
players are known. If s is a strategy profile played in a game, then ui(s) denotes a payoff 
function defining i’s payoff as an outcome of s. 
There are two main branches of game theory: cooperative and non-cooperative. Non-
cooperative GT addresses interactions among individual players, each aiming to achieve 
their own goal, namely improving its utility, or reducing its costs. Specifically, in 
cooperative games the utility does not only depend on a single node’s strategy, but also on 
the strategies of other nodes within a coalition. Hence, cooperative game theory is more 
elaborate. Especially in realistic situations where entities can participate in several coalitions, 
the potential structure of these coalition allocations is more complex; thus there is a need to 
for concepts that could reduce the complexity, without identifying and comparing all of the 
2n – 1 possible coalitions.  
One of the concepts for solving non-cooperative games is the Nash equilibrium. Nash 
equilibrium is a stable solution of the game such that no player has reason to unilaterally 
change its action, since it may not improve its utility function. More precisely, a strategy 
profile set s*  = {s*1,…,s*N} is a NE if for ∀si ∈ Si  and for ∀i ∈	N,  u(s*i , s*-i) ≥ u(si , s*-i) . A 
strategy set that corresponds to the Nash equilibrium signifies a consistent prediction of the 
outcome of the game. In other words, if all players predict that Nash equilibrium will occur, 
there is no player in the game that has incentives to choose a different strategy. Any game 
allowing mixed strategies has at least one NE. However, some pure strategy normal form 
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games may not have a NE solution at all. Therefore it is relevant to formulate the utility 
function in such a way that the game has at least one equilibrium point. 
When efficiency is important, Pareto Optimality is used. The existence of Nash Equilibrium 
does not assure that the outcome of a game will be beneficial for all players. Mathematically 
formulated, a strategy set s  = {s1,…,sN} is Pareto optimal if and only if there exists no other 
strategy set t = {t1,…,tN} such that ui (t) ≥ ui (s) for ∀i ∈ N , and for some k ∈ N , uk (t) > uk (s) 
In other words, Pareto optimal outcome cannot be improved upon without hurting at least 
one player. 
In this chapter we will focus on cooperative game theory and its application in localization 
algorithms.  
2. Coalitional games in wireless communications 
A coalition formation game is uniquely defined by the pair (N , v). N = {1,2,…,N} denotes the 
set of players, e.g., network entities, pursuing to form sets in order to collaborate with each 
other. Any nonempty subset S ∈ N is called a coalition. Coalitions with cardinality |S| = 1, 
are called singleton coalitions and N is called the grand coalition. The set of all coalitions in a 
game is called coalition structure and is denoted by P. v denotes the coalition value which 
quantifies the worth of a coalition in a game. 
2.1. Coalitional games – background 
Coalitional games in characteristic form are classified into two types based on the 
distributing of gains among users in a coalition:  
i. A transferable utility (TU) game where the total gain achieved can be apportioned in 
any manner between the users in a coalition subject to feasibility constraints, and  
ii. A non-transferable utility (NTU) game where the apportioning strategies have 
additional constraints that prevent arbitrary apportioning. Each payoff is dependent on 
joint actions within coalition. 
In TU games, the cooperation possibilities of a game can be defined by a characteristic 
function v that assigns a value v(S) to every coalition S. Here v(S) is called the value of 
coalition S, and it characterizes the total amount of transferable utility that the members of S 
could gain without any help from the players outside of S. In general, we use the term 
coalition structure to refer to any mathematical structure that describes which coalitions 
(within the set of all 2n – 1 possible coalitions) can effectively negotiate in a coalitional game.   
The overall goal is to find a coalition structure such that no group of players has the 
incentive to leave it – so called stable coalition structure. Superadditivity is defined in TU 
games as a property of the characteristic function: 
           1 2 1 2 1 2  ;   ,  , 1 2 .v S U S v S v S S S N S S   (1) 
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In other words, a TU game is superadditive if cooperation is always rewarding. Thus, grand 
coalition, i.e., the coalition comprising all sensors, is beneficial. The most notable solution 
concept for the coalition formation in superadditive games is the core; other solutions 
include Shapley value, kernel, and Nucleolus.  
The superadditivity concept can be extended to NTU games, by: 
             1 2 1 21 1,  { | }i ji S j Sx v S x v S v S U Sx  (2) 
In case of TU games, goal is to find a coalition structure that maximizes the total utility, 
while in NTU games it is the structure with Pareto optimal payoff distribution. A 
centralized approach can be used, but it is generally NP-complete. The reason is that finding 
an optimal partition requires iterating over all the partitions of the player set N. The number 
of partitions grows exponentially with the number of players in N. For example, for a game 
where N has 10 elements, the number of partitions that a centralized approach has to go 
through is 115,975 (easily computed through the Bell number (Saad W., et all, 2009c). 
Therefore, using a centralized approach for finding an optimal partition is, generally, 
computationally complex and not very practical. Nevertheless, many applications require 
the coalition formation process to take place in a distributed manner, so that the players 
have autonomy on the decision whether or not to join a coalition. Indeed, the complexity of 
the centralized approach has initiated a growth in the coalition formation literature, with the 
goal to find low complexity and distributed algorithms for establishing coalitions. 
A novel classification of coalitional games has been proposed in (Saad W., et all, 2009c). 
Games are grouped into three types: canonical games, coalition formation games and 
coalitional graph games. Their properties are shown in the following table. 
 
Canonical coalitional games Coalition formation games Coalitional graph games 
Grand coalition is the 
optimal structure 
Resulting coalitional 
structure depends on gains 
and costs 
Interaction of players 
depends on communication 
graph structure 
Goal: stabilize the grand 
coalition 
Goal: form appropriate 
coalition structure 
Goal: stabilize grand 
coalition or form network 
topology taking into 
account the communication 
graph 
Table 2. Classification of coalitional games 
In this chapter we will focus on coalition formation games. A generalized approach to 
coalition formation has been proposed in (Apt & Witzel, 2006). The notion of stable partition 
is used when there does not exist any other partition that would improve the total gain. In 
order to illustrate the coalition formation procedure, an abstract preference operator   has 
been introduced, and coalitions are being transformed using merge and split rules.  
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2.2. Applications to communication networks 
From the communication networks perspective, there is the need for developing distributed 
and flexible wireless networks, where the units make independent and rational strategic 
decisions. In addition, low complexity distributed algorithms are required, to capably 
represent collaborative scenarios between network entities. Non-cooperative games have 
been mainly applied for applications such as spectrum sharing, power control or resource 
allocation – mainly settings that can be seen as competitive scenarios. On the other hand, 
cooperative game theory provides analytical tools to study the behavior of rational players 
in cooperative scenarios. In particular, coalitional games show to be a very powerful tool for 
designing fair, efficient and robust cooperation strategies in communication networks. In 
order to highlight an expanding application field, in the following section we will give some 
examples on use of cooperative game theory for communication networks, and specifically 
for localization purposes.  
Physical layer security has been studied via coalitional games in (Saad W., et all, 2009a), (Saad 
W., et all, 2009b). In a distributed way, wireless users organize themselves into coalitions (see 
Figure 1.) while maximizing their secrecy capacity - maximum rate of secret information sent 
from a wireless node to its destination in the presence of eavesdroppers (Saad W., et all, 
2009a). This utility maximization is taking into consideration the costs occurring during 
information exchange. On the other hand, (Saad W., et all, 2009b) introduces a cooperation 
protocol for eavesdropper (attacker) cooperation. Here the utility function is formulated to 
capture the damage caused by the attackers, and the costs in terms of time spent for 
communication among the eavesdroppers. In both cases, independent disjoint coalitions will 
form in the network, as the grand coalition would involve various communication costs.  
 
Figure 1. Wireless users organized into coalitions 
(Mathur S., et all, 2006) and (Mathur S., et all, 2008) consider coalition structures in a 
wireless network where users are permitted to cooperate, while maximizing their own rates. 
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Here both transmitter and receiver cooperation in an interference channel is studied. Several 
models have been analyzed: a TU and an NTU model, and with perfect and partial 
cooperation. In (Mathur S., et all, 2006), the feasibility and stability of the grand coalition for 
all cases was evaluated, while the work in (Mathur S., et all, 2008) is focused on stable 
coalition structures. In (Saad W., et all, 2008) a game theoretical framework for virtual 
MIMO has been proposed, where single antenna transmitters self-organize into coalitions. 
The utility function denotes the total achieved capacity, and also includes the power 
constraint to account for the costs. 
In (Hao X., et all, 2011) the multi-channel spectrum sensing problem is formulated as a 
coalitional game, where players are secondary users that cooperatively sense the licensed 
channels of primary users.  The utility of each coalition reflects the sensing accuracy and 
energy efficiency. Distributed algorithms have been proposed to determine a stable coalition 
structure, maximizing the overall utility in the system. More game theory based solutions 
for spectrum sensing in cognitive radio have been proposed in (Khan Z., et all, 2010) and 
(Saad W., et all, 2009c). 
A network-level study using coalition formation has been performed in (Singh C., et all, 
2012), considering a scenario where service providers are cooperating in order to enhance 
the usage of the available resources. Particularly, different providers may serve each other’s 
customers and thereby increase the throughput and reduce the overall energy consumption. 
The model supports multi-hop networks and is not limited to stationary users and fixed 
channel conditions. A game theory based framework is used to determine optimal decisions 
and a rational basis for sharing the aggregate utility among providers. The optimal coalition 
structure can be obtained by means of convex optimization. 
Other applications of game theory include packet forwarding in ad hoc networks, 
distributed cooperative source coding, routing problems, and localization algorithms, which 
will be more elaborated in the next chapter. 
3. Game theory for localization algorithms 
The expansion and enhancement of wireless and mobile devices has aroused the demand of 
context-aware applications, in which location is often viewed as one of the most important 
contexts. Those applications include pervasive medical care, wireless sensor network 
surveillance, mobile peer-to-peer computing etc. The essential purpose of wireless sensor 
networks (WSN) is to provide information about observed events. Before the WSN can be 
exploited for various applications, knowledge about sensors’ locations is crucial, as 
otherwise the data might become meaningless. Furthermore, location information can be 
used to improve the communication system itself. Geo-location information can serve as 
complementary data to estimate and predict critical parameters for improving wireless 
communication networks, such as setting up location dependent load balancing schemes 
(Yanmaz E. & Tonguz O.K.). Several studies have shown how the efficiency of available 
radio resources can be improved by the availability of position information to provide 
accurate scheduling and link adaptation (Tang S., et all, 2009), or even the prediction of 
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required resources in a highly dynamic scenario. Additionally, localizing the nodes can help 
reduce power consumption in multi hop wireless networks. 
Global navigation satellite systems (GNSS), such as Global Positioning system (GPS) or the 
European satellite navigation system Galileo, are providing positioning information. 
However their accuracy strongly depends on the scenario. Especially in dense urban or 
indoor environments, navigation based on GNSS becomes inaccurate or impossible, since 
the necessary amount of 4 directly visible satellites is not reached. In order to provide 
accurate MT position estimation, the MT position shall be estimated with alternative 
techniques focusing on radio signals which are provided by the terrestrial RANs itself. The 
rapid deployment of WLAN and WPAN technologies, especially in dense indoor 
environments, made it another compelling choice for localization, relying only on the 
existing network infrastructure. 
Generally, the localization process assumes a number of location aware nodes, called 
anchors. In a typical two-stage positioning system, the first phase is the ranging phase, 
where nodes estimate the distances to their neighbors by observing time of arrival, received 
signal strength or some other distance dependent signal metric. In the second phase, nodes 
use the ranging information and the known anchor position for calculation of their 
coordinates.  
 
Figure 2. Two-stage positioning system 
One simple way for position calculation is trilateration / triangulation, based on the least 
square algorithm. Trilateration uses distance estimates to anchor nodes as input, and 
estimates target’s position based on geometric properties of triangles. Each estimated 
distance represents the radius of a circle centered at the corresponding reference node. For 
2-D positioning, measurements from at least three reference nodes are required, and the 
location is obtained as the intersection of circles. This method is also used for GPS. Having 
in mind the errors in estimated distances to the anchors, the geometrical trilateration 
technique can only provide a region of uncertainty, instead of a single point. Therefore the 
solution is based on iterative algorithms to obtain the node position by formulating and 
solving a set of nonlinear equations. 
The availability of positioning information depends on the existing infrastructure such as 
GPS satellites or base stations. Cooperative positioning techniques are used in scenarios 
where non-cooperative solutions are not feasible, or do not perform well in terms of 
accuracy, cost and complexity. The challenge is to allow nodes which are not in range of a 
sufficient number of anchors to be located, and hereby increase localization performance in 
terms of both accuracy and coverage. This can be achieved by means of iterative 
multilateration, among other solutions. Iterative multilateration is a way to expand 
localization coverage throughout the network in a step-by-step fashion, allowing also nodes 
which are not in range of a sufficient number of references to be localized. In this sense, 
Ranging Positioning algorithm
received 
signal metric
distance 
estimation
target 
position
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coverage is the fraction of nodes that have an accurate position estimate. It follows an 
iterative scheme: once an unknown node estimates its position, it becomes an anchor and 
broadcasts its position estimate to all neighboring nodes. The process is repeated until all 
nodes that can have three or more reference nodes obtain a position estimate. As a newly 
localized node is becoming new anchor for its neighbors, the estimation error of the first 
node can propagate to other nodes and eventually get amplified. Over iterations the error 
could spread throughout the network, leading to abundant error in large topologies.  
 
Figure 3. Iterative multilateration 
The number of actively participating nodes should be kept to a minimum, and therefore an 
appropriate cooperation subset has to be chosen, while the other nodes can be ignored. Such 
a restrictive and selective use of references is crucial in networks with limited resources. A 
frequently used method is to select the nearest k anchor nodes. However, this method does 
not take into account node geometry. Therefore other metrics such as geometric dilution of 
precision, Cramer Rao lower bound or stochastic observability are more appropriate. 
The geometric conditioning on localization accuracy is derived in the GDOP (geometric 
dilution of precision) metric (Spirito M.A., 2001). In brief, when reference nodes are well 
separated around the target, the GDOP is lower. 
Localization can be defined as an estimation problem where measurements like wireless 
signal strength, angle or time of arrival are provided to an estimator (i.e. the localization 
algorithm) to obtain the most likely position in the assumed coordinate system. The Cramer 
Rao Lower bound (CRLB) provides a lower bound on covariance of any unbiased estimator. 
In case of localization, the CRLB captures information about node geometry and ranging 
quality, i.e., quality of distance estimates obtained from noisy measurements of received 
signal strength (RSS), time of arrival (TOA) or angle of arrival (AOA) (Patwari N., et all, 
2003). Since the variance of position estimates is associated to the mean error, the lower 
bound on variance can be seen as the upper bound on accuracy.  
3.1. Use of game theory in localization algorithms 
Recently game theory has been applied in localization algorithms, mainly for modeling the 
cost-performance trade-off and for selection of reference nodes. The work in (Ghassemi F. & 
Krishnamurthy V., 2008a) applies game theory for sensor network localization, namely for 
measurement allocation among reference nodes localizing the target. The localization 
process has been modeled as a game belonging to the class of weighted-graph games. For 
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such a representation, the vertices correspond to the players, and the coalition value can be 
obtained by summing the weights of the edges that connect a pair of vertices in the coalition 
with self-loop edges only considered with half of their weights. A weighted-graph game can 
therefore be well represented by ( - 1)
2
N N
N  weights, in contrast to 2N numbers which are 
usually required to represent a cooperative game. Basic idea is to allocate more 
measurements to nodes that contribute more to the localization process. The allocation 
algorithm has been integrated into a Bayesian estimator. In (Ghassemi F. & Krishnamurthy 
V., 2008b), utility is defined as information gain from a node, i.e. the mutual information 
between the prior density of target position and the measurement. Additionally, a price for 
transmission is included to account for the current energy level in the nodes, and the energy 
needed for data transmission. 
The algorithm proposed in (Moragrega A., et all, 2011) assumes a number of static anchor 
nodes, strategically placed to guarantee coverage to all unknown nodes. Anchors 
transmitting with lower energy can provide coverage to a smaller number of nodes; aim is 
to minimize power consumption at the anchor nodes, while assuring desired localization 
accuracy. The metric for positioning quality is the GDOP. The problem has been formulated 
as a noncooperative game, using Nash equilibrium as solution concept 
In (Bejar B., et all, 2010) the coalition formation within the set of neighboring anchors helps 
reduce communication costs. Using only a subset of available reference nodes does not 
necessarily degrade the accuracy, since some of them provide redundant information. In 
some situations it might be even useful to discard ranging information from some reference 
nodes, after they have been identified as unreliable due to biases in the measurements. This 
paper the localization problem has been defined as a coalitional NTU game, where 
coalitions are formed based on the merge and split procedure. The utility function is defined 
to account for both a quality and cost indicator. While the quality function accounts for 
inconsistencies between each node’s measured distance and the final joint estimated 
distance within the coalition, the cost function is related to communication costs. The target 
tracking task based on coalition formation has been implemented using a Kalman filter. For 
the coalition formation approach a higher mean estimation error has been observed than for 
grand coalition, i.e., when all nodes contribute to the tracking process. Nevertheless, in 
terms of communication costs the proposed scheme provides significant savings. 
(Ghareshiran O. N. & Krishnamurthy V., 2010) proposes a dynamic coalition formation 
algorithm used for energy saving in multiple target localization. Assuming that nodes in sleep 
mode do not record any measurements and thereby save energy in both sensing and 
transmitting data, the optimization problem is formulated to maximize the average sleep time 
of all nodes in the network, assuring that targets are localized with desired accuracy. An 
important contribution is exploitation of spatial correlation of sensor readings. Accuracy 
metric used is the determinant of the Bayesian Fisher information matrix (B-FIM). The 
characteristic function is formulated in a way that larger coalitions of sensors do not 
necessarily lead to longer sleep times. This is mainly due to the fact that the B-FIM, depending 
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on both relative angles and distances of sensors to the target, does not automatically increase 
as the number of sensor nodes in a coalition goes up. The trade-off between performance and 
average sleep time allocated in the network is demonstrated via Monte Carlo simulations. 
4. Scenario 
We propose the use of cooperative non‐superadditive games for modeling localization 
algorithms. As stated in the previous section, a typical localization process consists of the 
ranging phase, where nodes estimate the distances to their neighbors, and a second phase 
where nodes use the ranging information and the known anchor position to calculate their 
coordinates. In a dense network one can assume a large number of available anchor nodes. 
However, transmitting and processing all the obtainable information would consume 
immense power, without necessarily leading to better localization performance. This is due 
to the fact that not all the anchors provide reliable measurements, what leads to erroneous 
distance estimates. Furthermore, the geometry of selected reference nodes shows to have 
significant impact on localization accuracy, what will be extensively elaborated in our work. 
Assuming that at each time instant a target has several neighboring anchor nodes in near 
vicinity, and different coalitions can be formed, the considered scenario is illustrated in 
Fig.4.  
 
Figure 4. Scenario 
We propose an algorithm for reference node selection based on coalitional games. We model 
the localization process as a cooperative game, and formulate the corresponding utility 
function. We define the node selection optimization as one that maximizes the accuracy 
subject to constraints given by nodes’ limited processing capacity. Position estimates are 
obtained using the linearized least squares algorithm (trilateration). 
4.1. Ranging error 
We assume that the distance estimates between nodes are obtained using RSS 
measurements. We use the standard lognormal model for RSS with path loss parameter np 
and shadowing variance Ϭ2RSS. Assuming that the received power Pi,j between nodes i and j 
is lognormal, the random variable Pi,j (dBm) =10logPi,j is Gaussian. RSS based distance 
estimates are obtained using the lognormal model: 
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where vi,j~ N (0, Ϭ2RSS) and np is the path loss exponent. We used values for indoor scenarios 
np= 2.3 and Ϭ2RSS = 3.92 dB as in (Patwari N., et all, 2003).  
4.2. Utility function 
The following parameters are relevant for reference node selection: number of references, 
quality of range estimates and geometry. Therefore we propose a node selection mechanism 
based on the Cramer Rao Lower Bound. Since the CRLB gives the upper bound on accuracy, 
the utility function has to be inversely proportional to the CRLB. Besides the quality 
indicator, utility function also has to reflect the cost. Cost is related to the energy spent for 
message exchanges between nodes, and is proportional to the distances of target node to 
reference nodes. Having in mind the energy consumption if all reference nodes were used 
for localization, the grand coalition is not optimal. Therefore we define the problem as a 
nonsuperaditive cooperative game. Since least square localization is not possible for less 
than three reference nodes, we set the value of all coalitions containing less than three nodes 
to zero. For the remaining ones, the coalition value of each chosen subset of nodes S will be 
of the form:  
 ,
1
( ) i t
i Si S
d
v S
CRLB R
    (4) 
Where CRLBi∈S is the CRLB for the coalition S, di,t is the distance from node i ∈ S to the target 
t, and R is the transmission range, used to normalize the cost function. In order to illustrate 
the performance of coalition formation based node selection, we will perform an exhaustive 
search over all possible coalition sets containing three nodes. The results are presented in the 
next section. 
5. Results 
In this section we show through simulations how localization performance can be improved 
using cooperative game theory. Performance metrics are accuracy, complexity and latency. 
Accuracy is evaluated as the Euclidean distance between the estimated position, and the 
node’s true location. Complexity is especially important in scenarios with low-power 
devices. In cellular scenarios computation is mainly performed in a central manner, e.g., at 
the base station with power supply, computational and processing complexity is not 
necessarily a limitation. In case of a moving target, its position needs to be updated with a 
frequency depending on the mobility model. Therefore it is important for the position 
calculation to be fast. We evaluate the localization accuracy as the root mean square error 
(RMSE) of location estimates. Complexity is assessed by means of amount of computation 
that has to be performed, while latency refers to the time needed to get a position estimate – 
particularly important for dynamic scenarios.  
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In our simulations we assume that the target node has a number of reference nodes in local 
vicinity, uniformly distributed within a 20 by 20 meters region. We show how appropriate 
selection of reference nodes outperforms the random selection, for cases of 10, 15 and 20 
available references. We performed simulations for different node densities and compared 
them in terms of root-mean-square error (RMSE). We performed 1000 runs for each setup. 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Localization accuracy for random anchor selection and utility based selection. 
The following scatter plot illustrates how the coalition value reflects the localization error. 
In Fig.6 we assumed 10 available reference nodes. Besides accuracy, we will assess the 
complexity of the algorithm depending on the number of available reference nodes, namely 
considering sets of 10, 15, 20, 25 and 30 nodes, respectively. From each of these sets, three 
anchors providing the best results are chosen. We define computational complexity as the 
amount of time spent on localization, in this case on a simulation run. The measurement of 
computation time is calculated using MATLAB functions tic and toc, which return the 
elapsed time in seconds. Knowing that combinatorial complexity increases with number of 
elements, Fig. 7 shows the expected result, namely significantly higher complexity as the 
number of references increases. 
Since we consider a static scenario, the latency factor is not of particular significance. 
However, one can consider the computation time in Fig. 7 as a latency parameter as well. 
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Figure 6. Localization error vs. coalition value 
 
 
Figure 7. Computation time. 
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6. Conclusion 
In this chapter we considered the application of coalitional games to communication 
networks, in particular to localization algorithms. Game theory proves to be a powerful tool 
for modelling various aspects of localization procedure, such as improved accuracy or 
energy saving. After giving an overview of the most significant contributions in the 
literature on this subject so far, we have proposed a localization procedure aiming to 
improve accuracy by selecting the references providing the best conditions in terms of 
channel conditions and node geometry. Besides providing better performance, choosing 
only a subset of available references contributes to resource saving. This is particularly 
important in wireless sensor networks, having in mind the nature of these networks, 
specifically the limited resources such as energy constraints, processing capacity and short 
transmission range.  
The selection procedure is based on coalitional game theory. We proposed a utility function 
that reflects the contribution of each coalition to the localization accuracy, as well as a cost 
function related to energy consumption during the localization procedure. We compared the 
performance of utility based node selection vs. a random selection scheme. Even though the 
computational complexity significantly increases for a large number of available references, 
the achieved accuracy improvements make it a compelling concept for node selection. 
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